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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to single out certain characterizations of the “I think” and the 
“transcendental subject” in an attempt to find out a connection with certain specific 
metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject introduced by Kant in the critical 
period: the thinking, as spontaneity, is the being itself. Most importantly, two distinct 
meanings of “I think” need be identified: according to the first, mainly found in the 
Transcendental Deduction, “I think” is the act of apperception, whereas, according to the 
second, found in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms in 
particular – I think is assumed in its representational nature. Secondly, the notion of the 
“transcendental subject” will be interpreted in formal terms as a specific concept that, 
mutatis mutandis, holds the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object”. 
 
 
1. Preliminaries 
In this paper the “I think” and the “transcendental subject” will be analysed in an 
attempt to find out a connection with certain specific metaphysical characterizations of 
the thinking subject introduced by Kant1 in the critical period: the thinking, as 
spontaneity, is the being itself.  
For it accompanies every single representation, the I think refers to the thinking 
subject regardless of its metaphysical nature. At the level of the metaphysics of the self, 
Kant speaks of the I (das Ich), the mind (das Gemüt), the thinking subject (das denkende 
Subjekt), and the soul (die Seele). Three points at issue stand out: (1) a semantic question 
concerning the type of reference of the representation I; (2) an epistemic question 
concerning the type of knowledge about the thinking subject produced by the 
representation I think; (3) a more strictly metaphysical question2 on the characteristics 
assigned to the nature of the thinking subject. 
From this specific perspective, all varieties of interpretations may be found in the 
debate: in particular, among these, an anti-metaphysical reading3, some of its arguments 
being based on Kant’s claims on the limits of cognition and objective significance, and 
others on Kant’s rejection of rational psychology, all aiming at ruling out the possibility 
of any doctrine on the nature of the self as such. As will be seen, though no Erkenntnis (in 
Kantian technical terms) of the self is possible since there can be no relation between a 
given representation and a spatial-temporal object to be regarded as a self, Kant maintains 
several metaphysical claims on the nature of the thinking subject. 
On the other hand, the empty form of the referential apparatus in transcendental 
apperception has been appraised in intrinsically different ways4. Two antithetical views 
on the central notions of the unity of apperception and of the identity of self-
consciousness are particularly important in this context: the substantial ownership 
reading, addressed in the influential works by Henrich5 and Guyer6, and the formal 
ownership reading, especially upheld by Allison. 
While the substantial ownership reading holds that in the absence of something 
identical or unified in different states, neither identity nor unity of consciousness is 
possible, according to the formal ownership reading the identity of self-consciousness 
cannot be considered as though there existed an identical or unified self. Based on the 
Paralogisms chapter of the Dialectic in particular, Allison7 emphasizes how Kant unfolds 
the illusion of considering the unity of apperception as the unity of a thing.  
Even if the representation I think produces no knowledge of a particular self, the I can 
still play a representational role. For instance, Horstmann8 identifies two theses which 
call the two readings to mind in more than one way: in the A-edition Paralogism, the 
representation I is referred to what is termed “substrate”, i.e., the I refers to an object 
even though this is not knowable. Instead, in the B-edition Paralogism, the “I think” 
should be regarded only as an act of spontaneity: no entity is picked out by the I of 
apperception, the I merely representing the spontaneous activity of thought.  
The aim of this paper is to single out certain characterizations of the “I think” on the 
basis of the formal ownership reading so as to place the Kantian metaphysical 
assumptions on the thinking subject in the context of this interpretative scenario. Most 
importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be identified (cf. §§ 2-3): according 
to the first, mainly found in the Transcendental Deduction, “I think” is the act of 
apperception, whereas, according to the second, found in Transcendental Deduction and 
in the section of Paralogisms in particular – I think (in italics in these pages) is assumed 
in its representational nature. Secondly, the notion of “transcendental subject” will be 
interpreted in formal terms as a specific concept that, mutatis mutandis, holds the same 
function of the concept of the “transcendental object”.  
Despite his holding a sharp separation between the metaphysical and the epistemic, 
Kant introduces two meanings of “I think” and the concept of “transcendental subject” to 
create a bridge between the two planes. In the last three paragraphs (§§4-6), I will attempt 
to show 1) that in line with the formal ownership reading, the identity or unity of self-
consciousness does not so much presuppose the identity of a real subject but a formal 
identity based on the representation I think; 2) that Kant establishes precise metaphysical 
characterizations about the nature of the thinking subject: the thinking, as spontaneity, is 
the being itself; 3) that, to some extent, such characterisations are captured by the concept 
of “transcendental subject”. The thinking being represents itself as a transcendental 
subject = x through the simple representation I. 
 
 
2. The transcendental deduction and the principle of the unity of apperception  
2.1 I think and the principle of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception 
In the famous passage B131-2, Kant introduces the transcendental unity of 
apperception. With Van Cleve, it is important to underline that the fragment indicates 
both a property and a principle: one ascribing the property to certain collections of 
representations of the being apprehended by the act of apperception9. 
In particular, passage B131-2 marks the incipit of the B-Deduction condensing two 
crucial points that have been widely tackled by leading commentators. The first has a 
more general scope and concerns single representations: in order for a subject to 
represent something, this subject must be able to think that every representation is its 
own. Obviously, the point here is not so much that de facto representations are 
accompanied by the “I think”, but the necessity of the possibility of representation of 
self-ascriptions10. In this respect, Ameriks refers to a personal quality assigned to 
individual representations so that these can present the form (E): “I think that x, I think 
that y, I think that z”11. Similarly, Carl speaks of the ability to make judgments from a 
first-person standpoint12. 
The second point concerns the set of representations accounting for a complex thought 
based on synthetic unity: the different representations will merge into one single 
consciousness as a thought ascribable to a subject, i.e., (T) “I think that (I think that x, I 
think that y, I think that z, etc.)”13. Not only must the uses of I be co-referential – the “I” 
thinking x must be identical to the “I” thinking y, and so on – but the identity of “I think” 
must also concern the highest-ranking “I think” (outside of parentheses here), upon which 
lies the synthesis of various representations in a single complex thought.  
Taken together, for Allison these two points set up the principle of the necessary 
synthetic unity of apperception14, for which “all my representations in any given intuition 
must stand under the condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self 
as my representations, and thus can grasp them together, as synthetically combined in an 
apperception, through the general expression I think” (B138). As will be seen below, in 
passages B137 and B138 Kant holds this principle to be analytic. 
The constituents of a complex thought must be connected in a synthetic unity to allow 
for their ascription to a single thinking subject. Through this very act, the thinking subject 
brings the components of a complex thought into a synthetic unity and ascribes them to 
its identical self. Consequently, the one is the condition of the other and vice versa: the 
condition of possibility of the self-ascription of single representations is based on the fact 
that these can be brought into a synthetic unity, and the condition of possibility of such a 
synthetic unity is determined by the fact that the representations composing it can be 
ascribable to a single thinking subject. 
If, then, a single complex thought logically involves a single thinking subject, it 
follows that every single component of such a complex thought must be ascribable to an 
identical thinking subject, and that the thinking subject must be aware of its identity in 
the synthetic unity of such a complex thought. In another famous excerpt, Kant holds that 
the analytical unit of apperception presupposes a synthetic unity: the consciousness of the 
“I think” identity requires not only a synthesis, but also a consciousness of the synthesis 
identity: “it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in 
these representations itself” (B 134). Following Rosenberg, “the I that thinks X = the I 
that thinks Y” presupposes the possibility of the synthetic unity of apperception: “I think 
(X + Y)”15. 
Within Transcendental Deduction, all this should be related to the associations 
between synthesis, representations, and object, and between apperception, intellect, and 
judgment, specifying the categories as the conditions of possibility of knowledge. While 
the intellect is the faculty of knowledge through concepts, the object is what is given 
through the synthesis of the manifold in intuition on a conceptual basis. The union of 
representations via conceptual synthesis would not exist without the unity of 
apperception, which refers them to a given object to establish their objective validity (B 
137). The unification of representations should also be linked to the faculty of judgment – 
regarded as the faculty of applying rules – and articulated according to the well-known 
distinction between objective and subjective unity of consciousness (cf. B 139-142).  
If some features are to be ascribed to an object as such through the judgment, the 
scheme “x is F” – and the unity that follows – must be related to more than a simple “I 
think that x is F”. The original synthetic unity of apperception stands for the necessary 
possibility of an all-inclusive “I think”, i.e., the highest level of “I think” which is used to 
link all first-order acts of thought based on the scheme “I think that: I think that x is F, I 
think that y is G, I think that z is H, and so forth”16. 
 
2.2 The I think is the act of apperception 
The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme principle in the 
whole of human cognition (B135) and the objective condition of all cognition (B138).  
In the first place, the principle seems to equate the transcendental apperception with “I 
think”, as asserted in B137, whereby Kant explicitly states that the “I think” is the act of 
apperception: 
 
The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold 
of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. All the 
manifold representations of intuition stand under [this principle] insofar as they must be 
capable of being combined in one consciousness; for without that nothing could be thought or 
cognized through them, since the given representations would not have in common the act of 
apperception, I think, and thereby would not be grasped together in a self-consciousness.  
 
As seen above, in B138 Kant also uses the “I think” as an expression of the act of 
apperception: all representations in any given intuition must stand under the condition of 
apperception through which the subject can ascribe them to its identical self as its own 
representations and combine them synthetically through the general expression “I think”. 
The same point is expressed in B140, where Kant distinguishes the necessary and 
universally valid “objective unity of consciousness” from the subjective unity of 
apperception, which is a determination of the inner sense through which that manifold of 
intuition is empirically given: “The pure form of intuition in time, on the contrary, merely 
as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, stands under the original unity of 
consciousness, solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to 
the one I think, thus through the pure synthesis of the understanding, which grounds a 
priori the empirical synthesis”. 
As mentioned above, the principle of the unity of apperception expresses an analytic 
proposition even though it is based on the introduction of the synthetic unit of the 
manifold in the intuition (B138): the statement “the synthetic unity of consciousness is an 
objective condition of all cognition” expresses an analytical principle asserting that all 
representations must stand under such a principle in order for the thinking subject to 
ascribe them to its identical self as its representations. Only in this way can the subject 
grasp them as a synthetically combined whole in apperception; this act of apperception of 
conjunction is precisely expressed by the universal expression “I think”. 
 
2.3 A vicious cycle 
As will be discussed in the next paragraph, I think (in italics in these pages) is also 
considered a concept or representation, though of special kind. However, it is precisely at 
this stage in the Transcendental Deduction that Kant recognizes a double meaning for “I 
think”, namely, as an act and as a representation, which seems to trigger paradoxical 
consequences in a famous passage. 
In B132 Kant states that the representation I think is an act of spontaneity, i.e., it is not 
concerned with sensibility but with pure apperception – to distinguish it from the 
empirical – or original; it corresponds to that self-consciousness producing the 
representation I think which accompanies all representations although it cannot be 
accompanied by any further representation in turn. Howell remarks that the ensuing 
circularity – the representation I think is the act of apperception producing the 
representation I think – is “a hasty way of stressing the spontaneity and underivedness of 
the I think”: the capacity or faculty of apperception is original (A117), and produces “the 
underived and not-further-explicable I think”17. In others words, based on the 
transcendental apperception – understood as the act of conjunction of the representations 
in synthetic unity – the thinking subject is characterized as a self-conscious subject 
through the first-person representational component I think. 
By equating it with the transcendental apperception, “I think” is considered an act of 
conjunction of the representations that establishes the supreme principle of all cognition. 
On the other hand, at the very heart of the Transcendental Deduction the I think is 
described as a representation that accompanies and makes all other representations 
possible by representing the identical self of the thinking subject in the synthetic unit.  
This last point – the I as a representation of the identical self – is restated at the heart 
of the Transcendental Deduction, namely in B135, in a much more straightforward way 
than in B132. Immediately after the passage where the principle of the necessary unity of 
apperception is held to be analytic, Kant asserts that “without [a synthesis of the manifold 
given in an intuition] [the] thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness could not be 
thought”. In the following paragraph this constant identity is related to the representation 
I: Kant goes beyond saying that I is a representation and specifies that it is a simple one: 
“through the I, as a simple representation, nothing manifold is given; it can only be given 
in the intuition, which is distinct from it, and thought through combination in a 
consciousness”. 
Notwithstanding Kant’s huge effort to keep the two planes apart, these passages are 
paradigmatic examples of the close connection between the metaphysical and the 
representational dimensions and of the fact that two different meanings of “I think” are 
taken into account here: as it will be said, they are two faces of the same principle. The 
proposal just outlined should be discussed and argued based on the ontological question 
that Kant introduces by equating the thinking with the being. Before, however, a more 
detailed discussion on I think in its representational sense is needed. 
 
3. Transcendental Dialectic: the I think and the analysis of the Paralogisms 
3.1 The analysis of the Paralogisms: an epistemic closure 
It is in the Transcendental Dialectic, precisely in the section on the Paralogisms of 
Pure Reason, that Kant focuses more explicitly on the I think as a concept or 
representation and assigns a number of features to it. In this section Kant establishes a 
sort of epistemic closure regarding the ontological nature of the thinking subject, denying 
the possibility for the pure or empirical apperception to be the object of knowledge 
regardless of the conditions of possible experience. No psychological idea can be 
associated to a knowable content: in the Kantian nomenclature, transcendental ideas are 
necessarily produced by reason and, unlike the categories of the intellect, have no 
objective reference in experience. In particular, with the first of the transcendental ideas – 
the psychological idea proper – by introducing the idea of an ultimate unconditional 
subject the reason tries to find a suitable object in “I myself, considered merely as 
thinking nature (soul)” (A682/B710). At the beginning of both editions of the chapter on 
Paralogisms (B399), Kant defines the I think as concept: although it takes no part in the 
general list of the transcendental concepts, and although it has no special title, the I think 
is a transcendental concept for it is the vehicle of all concepts, included the 
transcendental ones, and serves to introduce all thinking to the sphere of consciousness.  
Kant attacks any metaphysical approach attempting to found a rational doctrine of the 
soul (rationale Seelenlehre) based on the inferences that employ the concept I 
independently of experience. By means of such inferences, and without the conditions of 
applicability of the categories to the intuitions, the rationale Seelenlehre claims to know 
the nature of the subject as a soul or as a thinking substance by the a priori ascription of 
categories considered as transcendental predicates to the I or soul, thus taken as noumenal 
object. 
In particular, on account of a systematic connection (Zusammenhang), Kant outlines 
the dialectical propositions and rejects rational psychology’s claims and its related topics 
produced following the Leitfaden of categories, to assign a thinking entity the following 
intrinsic features: 1. the soul is substance; 2. in its quality, simple; 3. in the different times 
in which it exists, numerically identical, i.e., unity (not plurality); 4. in relation to 
possible objects in space (A345/B403). The categorical titles do not follow the standard 
method and start from the category of the relation to proceed with quality, quantity, and 
mode: Kant’s first aim is to analyse rational psychology’s propositions with neither 
intrusion of the experience nor intervention of a perceived existence. 
In the A-version Kant highlights the paralogistic nature of the four propositions of 
topics: the application of these characteristics produces only an illusory knowledge, 
which may also take the form of a fallacious syllogism: the paralogism proper. With 
regard to the B-version, Capozzi points out the presence of two distinct arguments18: in 
the first argument, Kant examines the soul based on pure apperception and discloses that 
a) analytically, the topics of the rational doctrine of the soul are not attainable; b) 
synthetically, the first proposition of the topics referring to the substantiality of the 
thinking being as such, from which the others derive, is not attainable. With the second 
argument Capozzi highlights how Kant does proceed from a different assumption: a 
rationale Seelenlehre built through an analytical procedure whose object is the perception 
of an existence – the Cartesian cogito ergo sum – is groundless. In this case, Kant refers 
to the empirical apperception, the inner sense, and applies his analysis to the “I think”, 
which is allegedly assumed to be real and, therefore, perceived as existing in the stream 
of consciousness. 
The two arguments are based on the distinction, which will be taken up later, between 
the proposition “I think” meant in a Cartesian way, which comes with the perception of 
an existence, and the proposition “I think” assumed problematically, i.e., in “its mere 
possibility, in order to see which properties might flow from so simple a proposition as 
this for its subject (whether or not such a thing might now exist)” (A347; cf. B406). 
This distinction is associated with a further distinction between transcendental and 
empirical apperception, which establishes “how the I that I think is to differ from the I 
that intuits itself […] and yet be identical with the latter as the same subject” and, 
therefore, “I as intelligence and thinking subject cognize my self as an object that is 
thought, insofar as I am also given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not 
as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to myself” (B156). 
 
3.2 I as a concept 
As mentioned above, the first argument of the B-version consists of two parts: the 
first, analytic, is developed in B407-409, and the second, synthetic, in B410-413. Both 
sections show that the propositions of topics of rationale Seelenlehre are not valid, i.e., 
no knowledge of the thinking subject’s metaphysical nature is attainable. 
The analytic approach dwells on the analysis of the consciousness of the self and 
thought in general, which cannot lead to a determination of the metaphysical thinking 
subject as object. With this respect, Kant is forthright: “All modi of self-consciousness in 
thinking are therefore not yet themselves concepts of the understanding of objects 
(categories), but mere functions, which provide thought with no object at all, and hence 
also do not present my self as an object to be cognized” (B407). It is not the determining 
self but only what pertains to the determinable self – i.e., the inner intuition – that can be 
an object to be cognized. 
At the same time, in the four categorical titles Kant introduces a clear-cut distinction 
between a metaphysical and a representational plane, between the “thinking subject”, or 
“thinking I” considered as a determining subject, and the logical subject, or the “I” of 
apperception. The thinking or determining subject is what determines the relation making 
up every judgment. Kant explicitly expounds this in the first title on substantiality: “in 
every judgment I am always the determining subject of that relation that constitutes the 
judgment” (B407). As for the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction, it seems clear 
that the subject that determines the relation making up the judgment is determining by 
virtue of the features assigned to the unit of transcendental apperception. In the following 
passages in B407, Kant shifts focus from the metaphysical plane of the determining 
subject to a representational one, i.e., the representation of “I”: the subject that thinks is 
one thing, but what is represented in thought as subject is another. This step is necessary 
in order to introduce the well-known epistemic closure: through the representation of a 
subject it is not possible to assert that the thinking self is a substance. 
The same argumentative structure recurs in three other titles. For example, under the 
title of simplicity, the I of apperception is a representation which designates a logically 
simple subject; it follows that I features in every thought. If the concept of “thought” is 
analysed, the representation I is implicit in it, producing an analytic proposition. 
Likewise, the propositions that the I of apperception is identical in each manifold, and 
that its existence as a thinking being is distinct from external things are analytic. 
Nonetheless, the characteristics assigned to the representation I allow no epistemic 
conclusion; in particular, from the representation of a subject as an essentially simple, 
identical substance detached from matter it is not possible to conclude that the thinking 
self is a simple, identical substance detached from the body. These are synthetic 
propositions that need not only the involvement of the categories, but also an intuition. In 
the transcendental system, however, the intuition can only be sensible: it cannot take part 
in the intellect or in the field of thought, hence the simple representation I – referred to as 
the poorest representation of all – lies solely in such a field (B408). 
The same conclusion can be drawn with reference to the synthetic moment. The 
synthetic method is based on the syllogism, regarded as a synthetic, rational, and 
necessary procedure used as early as in 1781 to criticize rational psychology’s attempts to 
obtain the four syllogisms of the topics. The introduction to the four paralogisms remains 
unaltered, but in the B-version Kant just shows the paralogistic character of the syllogism 
on the substantial nature of the thinking subject19: 
 
What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is 
therefore substance.  
Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. 
Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance. (B411) 
 
Kant explains why the syllogism is a paralogism by unmasking a sophisma figurae 
dictionis based on the ambiguous nature of the middle term: the predicate of the minor 
premise does not coincide with the subject of the major premise.  
Even in the synthetic moment Kant analyses the representational nature of the I 
starting precisely from the different meaning of the middle term in the two premises. In 
the major premise the thought or concept’s reference is a being that can be thought of in 
every respect and, as such, that can be given in intuition. On the other hand, in the minor 
premise the concept’s reference is the self-consciousness; here, if what is represented is 
the relation to oneself as subject (as the form of thinking), in the concept of “Thinking” 
“the I always serves as subject of consciousness” (B142). The only possible conclusion 
that can be drawn from this argument is not the paralogistic interpretation on the 
metaphysical nature of the thinking entity existing as a substantial subject20, but the one 
concerning a tautological proposition that simply specifies the concept of the thought 
analytically. For this reason, it is not possible to assign any property to the manner of 
existence of the thinking subject: “in thinking my existence I can use myself only as the 
subject of judgment, which is an identical proposition, that discloses absolutely nothing 
about the manner of my existence” (B412). 
All this reflects Kant’s Copernican turn: in the transcendental approach, the first-order 
talk about objects is replaced by a second-order talk about the concept of an object and 
the conditions of the representation of an object. In this case, what we are referring to is 
the thinking I, so the first-order talk about the determining subject or apperception is 
replaced by the second-order talk about the concept of thinking or the self-consciousness 
through which the subject represents its relation with itself as subject.  
In Anthropology and Fortschritte Kant regards the I of apperception as being strongly 
linked with the logical I 21. This connection is articulated in Opus Postumum, where Kant 
maintains that the first act of the faculty of representation is the consciousness of oneself, 
which is a merely logical act, as we will see in § 4. The I of apperception is the logical 
subject, which specifies the simple representational nature of the I in I think. 
 
3.3 The “I exist thinking”: the empirical apperception 
In Anthropology Kant introduces the “I as subject” and “I as object” based on the 
distinction between transcendental and empirical apperception22: 
 
If we consciously represent two acts: inner activity (spontaneity), by means of which a 
concept (a thought) becomes possible, or reflection; and receptiveness (receptivity), by means 
of which a perception (perception), i.e., empirical intuition, becomes possible, or 
apprehension; then, consciousness of one’s self (apperception) can be divided into that of 
reflection and that of apprehension. The first is a consciousness of the understanding, pure 
apperception; the second a consciousness of the inner sense, empirical apperception. In this 
case, the former is falsely named inner sense. - In psychology we investigate ourselves 
according to our ideas of the inner sense; in logic, according to what intellectual consciousness 
suggest. Now here the ‘I’ appears to us as to be double (which would be contradictory): 1) the 
‘I’ as subject of thinking (in logic), which means pure apperception (the merely reflecting ‘I’), 
and of which there is nothing more to say except that it is a very simple idea; 2) The ‘I’ as 
object of the perception, therefore of the inner sense, which contains a manifold of 
determinations that make an inner experience possible.  
 
The distinction enables the subject to (re)present itself in two ways: through the “I” 
that thinks and through the “I” that intuits itself. In another passage, Kant states that “The 
I can be taken in a twofold manner: I as human being and I as intelligence. I in the first 
sense means: I am an object of the inner and the outer sense. I in the second sense means 
that I am the object of the inner sense only”23. Obviously, this does not imply two Is: “I as 
a thinking being am one and the same subject with myself as a sensing being”24. 
Unlike the “I think” regarded as an equivalent a priori proposition to the I am 
thinking, from the empirical angle the “I think” is an equivalent empirical proposition to 
the I exist thinking: there is no logical function any longer, but only the determination of 
the subject at the level of existence, i.e., the Cartesian cogito ergo sum, as seen above. 
The object of intuition necessarily involves the inner sense: the I as object of perception 
is revealed by the empirical apperception as a phenomenon that unfolds through the form 
of time. From the angle of receptivity, at first glance the consciousness of the self as the 
object of perception appears variable, “it can provide no standing or abiding self in this 
stream of inner appearances” (A 107). 
In primis, also as regards the empirical apperception, Kant rejects the possibility to 
move from the inner perception of something existing as thinking (what Kant terms “eine 
unbestimmte empirische Anschauung” – B 423 n.) to the determination of this something 
as existing substance in time and space, the forms of inner and outer sense through which 
all phenomena are given; otherwise, this would not be thought, but matter. The 
consciousness of the self as contemplated by the empirical apperception is the inner 
perception of something that is not the object of the outer sense25. 
For this reason, from the empirical angle the I think “expresses an indeterminate 
empirical intuition, i.e., a perception” (B 423 n.); such is an empirical intuition because 
the empirical-existential proposition I think/I exist lies on a sensation belonging to 
sensibility and revealing itself only in time. Moreover, it is indeterminate due to the lack 
of space, namely the form in and through which the objects manifest themselves and are 
determined26. 
 
4. Thinking is being 
Two distinct meanings of the “I think” have been identified: the first, mainly present in 
the Transcendental Deduction, regards the “I think” as the act of apperception. The 
second, present in Transcendental Deduction, and especially in the section on 
Paralogisms, considers the I think (in italics in these pages) in its representational nature. 
With Ameriks, the latter can be considered the thought of the I as epistemic subject, the 
general representation of the I as the subject of apperception standing for something 
present in the general thought of the transcendental apperception. The former, on the 
other hand, is the thought of the I as existing subject: “wherever there really is an 
epistemic subject, there is a confrontation with one’s own ‘being itself’, an I that at least 
has ‘existence’”27.  
Even though for Ameriks it is no mystery how the same being can be both kinds of 
subjects, these characterizations are very different. In what follows, Kant specifies a 
precise ontological issue: I as existing subject is the thinking, so the thinking is the being 
itself. In the next section it shall be argued that thinking as being can be thought through 
the concept of transcendental subject. 
As seen in the first critique, Kant affirms that pure apperception is the original 
consciousness. As a fundamental transcendental principle, in Opus postumum Kant states 
that “The first act of the faculty of representation is the consciousness of myself which is 
a merely logical act underlying all further representation, through which the subject 
makes itself into an object”28. If the faculty of representation proceeds from apperceptio, 
understood as a merely logical act or as an act of thought, the self-consciousness is the 
first act of knowledge: 
 
The first act of knowledge, rather, is: I am an object of thought (cogitabile) and intuition 
(dabile) for myself, initially as pure (not empirical) representation, which knowledge is called 
a priori. This act contains as the formal element of this unity a principle of the connection of 
the manifold of these representations, independent of all perception.29 
 
The pure apperception can be expressed by sum. With Capozzi, an ontological 
question arises here: sum is nothing but activity – this having nothing receptive about it – 
as it will not mingle with any element in the sensible dimension. It is a thinking activity 
to the extent that sum and cogito are on a par, in the first act of knowledge “I am 
thinking” is a tautology: “In the proposition: I am thinking, because it is completely 
identical, no progress, no synthetic judgment is given to me; for it is tautological and the 
alleged inference: I think, therefore I am, is no inference”30. The ontological question is 
specified in the assertion that the subject bound to the first act of knowledge – i.e., to 
former apperception – is the first subject and the first Wesen being thought: with the first 
act of knowledge, expressed by the verb “I am”, the subject is the being itself: 
 
The first act of knowledge is the verb: I am, - self-consciousness, for I, [as] subject, am an 
object to myself. In this, however, there lies a relation which precedes all determination of the 
subject, namely, the relation of intuition to the concept, in which the I is taken doubly (that is, 
in a double meaning) insofar as I posit myself: that is, on the one hand, as thing in itself (ens 
per se), and, secondly, as object of intuition; to be precise, either objectively as appearance, or 
as constituting myself a priori into a thing (that is, as thing [Sache] in itself).31 
 
Therefore, the “I” as subject – the self-consciousness – is the being itself. The passage 
B429 highlights the point: “in the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the 
being itself”. Sum/cogito refers to a subject/being that exhibits no properties because it is 
a something in general (A355). Here Kant is claiming that the subject has an intellectual 
consciousness of itself as the existence of the being itself (Das Wesen selbst), regarded as 
something (ein Etwas) unknown. 
This self-consciousness is specified in representational terms, “as intellectual 
consciousness of my existence, in the representation I am, which accompanies all my 
judgments and actions of my understanding” (BXL). In B277 Kant states: “the 
representation I am, which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thinking, 
is that which immediately includes the existence of a subject in itself”.  
From this metaphysical perspective there emerge a few characterizations of the 
thinking subject that may explain the absence of an epistemic identification in the 
representational synthesis. On the one hand, the I think/I am is the I as epistemic subject, 
the formal condition of all thinking: “the I think must be able to accompany all 
representations” (B 132); “the representation I am accompanies all my judgments and 
actions of my understanding” (BXL). Yet, the self-consciousness is the consciousness of 
a subject/being considered as something in general, namely something unidentifiable 
from an epistemic perspective. The I as existing subject is an intellectual awareness of 
self-existence summarized by those I am or I think representations that accompany every 
other representation; as such, they present no proprieties. In point of fact, due to the 
absence of intuition, it is not possible to determine if that something does exist as a 
persistent substance in order to make knowledge. This basic kind of consciousness 
discloses one’s own self and existence, i.e., what has been referred to as a kind of special 
self-familiarity, in a way that cannot be reduced in the terms of a description32. Ameriks 
refers to this as the fundamental thesis33: “in the consciousness of myself in mere 
thought, I am the being itself, although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought” (B 
429). 
What is being assumed according to the representation I is just an existent devoid of 
any proprieties. The subject is able to know that it exists as a thinking activity: “I exist as 
an intelligence that is merely conscious of its faculty for combination” (B159); however, 
it is not able to know what it is: “I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active 
being; rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought […].Yet this spontaneity is 
the reason I call myself an intelligence” (B158)34.  
The subject’s being is inaccessible from an epistemic angle: what is given is nothing 
but thoughts regarded as its predicates, which cannot enable one to grasp the thinking 
subject’s nature. If the subject bound to the first act of knowledge is the first object being 
thought, and if the relative representation is a representation of an indeterminate aliquid, 
nothing more than a logical identity can be given through the I taken as the 
representational subject that accompanies all thoughts.  
5. The concept of transcendental subject  
With reference to these metaphysical considerations, how many selves are there? This 
issue also touches the question regarding the nature of transcendental idealism and the 
important distinction between “appearances” and “things in themselves”. As is known, 
there is currently a lot of debate about this topic35: even though there is a continuum of 
interpretive views, roughly Kantian scholars account for this distinction in two ways: the 
first is called “one-world” or “two-aspect” interpretations (appearances and things in 
themselves are the same things); the second is called “two-world” or “two object” 
interpretations (appearances and things in themselves are not, in any important sense, the 
same things). As Marshall points out, “understanding Kant’s metaphysics of the self is 
more directly relevant to interpreting his transcendental idealism than many of his readers 
have assumed”36, above all in order to corroborate the “one-world” or “two-aspect” 
interpretation. For instance, for the Allison’s two-aspect view the distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves has an epistemic rather than an ontological import, 
since it has to be considered a difference between two types of concept of an object rather 
than two kinds of object. The concept of the object as appearance involves a reference to 
the necessary conditions for the cognition of an object while the concept of the object as 
thing in itself includes no such reference, i.e. it abstracts from the cognitive standpoint.  
In effect, not only both phenomenal and noumenal aspects are ascribed to the self or the 
subject, but in several passages (cf. infra) Kant suggests that if the subject appears as to 
be double, this does not imply the ontological commitment to two Is, on the contrary “I as 
a thinking being am one and the same subject with myself as a sensing being”37.  
Consequently, Kant seems to introduce no different selves or entities but different types 
of self-representation. 
With Ameriks, two different theoretical dimensions are to be singled out. The first 
concerns the distinction just stated, between the I as existing subject and the I as 
epistemic subject, which is internal to the transcendental apperception apparatus. The 
second dimension regards the manifold characterisations attributed to the different 
“selves”, each time identified according to the transcendental and empirical 
distinguishing characteristics of apperception and the consequent two ways the subject 
can represent itself (cf. infra)38. In this respect, Van Cleve indicates at least three ways: 1) 
the empirical self or subject, the self as encountered in introspection based on empirical 
apperception; 2) the transcendental self or subject, which is the thinker of our thoughts, 
the haver of our experiences; 3) “finally, the noumenal self is the ‘self in itself’ — the 
real self or the self as it really is”39. As Van Cleve holds three selves to be too many, he 
reduces their number by equating the transcendental self with the noumenal self: “The 
transcendental self must exist in its own right, I mean that it must exist independent of 
being represented”40. 
One can’t but assume the existence of the noumenal subject: “If thinkers or 
representers were not noumenal beings, we would have the absurdity of something that 
exists only as the content of representations, yet is itself the subject of representations”41. 
This, however, does not imply the transcendental subject to be equated with the noumenal 
subject; for instance, for Schulting the transcendental subject, considered as the logical 
characteristics of the thinking subject, is not – or, at least, need not be – equivalent to the 
noumenal self. For Rosenberg, the transcendental subject is a “formal” notion, adverting 
to modes of representation42. In my view, the notion of transcendental subject is just as 
“formal” as that of “transcendental object”. 
The thinking subject has intellectual consciousness of itself just as of the existence of 
the being itself (Das Wesen selbst); this is considered an indeterminate aliquid (ein 
Etwas), an object that cannot be acquired in the same way as phenomena. Obviously, it 
cannot be acquired as noumenon either, otherwise the thinking subject might intuit itself 
through apperception. For these reasons, Kant states that “in the synthetic original unity 
of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in 
myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting” (B 157). 
“The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition at all, but a merely 
intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject” (B 278). 
To think this something as an indeterminate object (which is not known in the manner 
of phenomena), Kant introduces the concept of transcendental subject that must be 
related to the representation I to play the same role of the concept of the transcendental 
object. As will be seen soon, despite this functional equivalence, the two notions display 
remarkably different characterisations: the I think is a representational unicum. 
According to the well-known distinction between “noumenon” and “phenomenon”43, 
the object has an existence in itself and is presented as a phenomenon through intuition. 
Provided that it is neither possible to know an object in itself nor assign it certain 
properties beyond the representational order, to think an object in itself one must employ 
the indeterminate thought that something in general (= x) exists in itself and appears 
through the intuition (A 104). The concept of an object in general is nothing but the 
concept of a transcendental object. Intuitions are sensible singular representations that 
immediately refer to objects, whereas appearances – the products of this relation – are 
representations that must be kept distinct from what is referred to as “transcendental 
object” (= x). Considered in its function, the concept of a general or transcendental object 
(= x) is the indeterminate thought of a single object having an existence in itself: it is the 
condition of possibility to think the singular object – spatio-temporally determined by the 
intuition as Erscheinung – to provide it with objective reality through the consequent 
unification of empirical concepts and the relative attribution of the properties presented 
by the intuition44. 
On the other hand, when Kant addresses “Thinking, taken in itself”, he states that 
“Thinking” is the logical function as well as sheer spontaneity, although no subject of 
consciousness is presented. The subject thinks itself in the same way it thinks an object in 
general: “In this way I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to 
myself, but rather I think myself only as I do every object in general from whose kind of 
intuition I abstract” (B429). 
The concept of transcendental subject (= x) is the indeterminate thought of a thinking 
being having an existence in itself. The famous passages A346/B404 introduce the 
concept of transcendental subject: when he criticises the possibility of a science of pure 
reason about the nature of the thinking being, Kant states that 
 
we can place nothing but the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of 
which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies 
every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is 
represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x which is recognized only through the 
thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the 
least concept. 
 
The thinking being represents itself as a transcendental subject = x through the wholly 
empty representation I. Nonetheless, the concept of a transcendental subject is different 
from the concept of a transcendental object in certain respects. The transcendental object 
is introduced to deal with the problem of objectivity, i.e., the issue of the 
“immanentization” of cognition: since it is impossible to stand outside representations to 
compare them with transcendentally real entities, the concept of a transcendental object 
should be considered a sort of transcendental pointer: “it serves to define the 
philosophical task by indicating that the commonsensical and transcendentally realistic 
concern with the “real” nature of objects must be replaced by a critical analysis of the 
conditions of the representation of an object”45. 
The concept of transcendental subject can be considered a sort of transcendental 
pointer too; however, since no intuition is given here, the concept of transcendental 
subject will enable no determination of a spatio-temporally singular object through the 
unification of the conceptual dimension: even though the I can be employed as a pointer 
to conceive the difference between the representation and what is represented, it cannot 
determine any experiential object: nothing else is given, nor can it be thought of, except 
the wholly empty representation I. 
The point is also stated in A350, where Kant critically points out that the first 
syllogism of transcendental psychology “imposes on us an only allegedly new insight” as 
it mistakes “the constant logical subject of thinking” for “the cognition of a real subject 
of inherence, with which we do not and cannot have the least acquaintance”. For Kant, 
“consciousness is the one single thing that makes all representations into thoughts, and in 
which, therefore, as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered”. 
Soon after, Kant states that “apart from this logical significance of the I, we have no 
acquaintance with the subject in itself that grounds this I as a substratum, just as it 
grounds all thoughts” (italics added).  
Therefore, the concept of transcendental subject is tantamount to the representation I 
or the logical I: the I is the simple and wholly empty representation; the transcendental 
subject is what is represented, an X. In B399 Kant already states that I think is a 
transcendental – therefore simple – concept for it is the vehicle of all transcendental 
concepts and “serves to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness”. Through 
this representation the subject can think itself as a thinking being and can refer to its own 
self based on transcendental designation.  
With the notion of transcendental designation, Kant anticipates some of the features of 
self-reference without identification46. The condition of possibility of all judgments relies 
on the act “I think” and, at this level, the intellectual representation I designates only 
transcendentally, no conceptual mediation being involved. It is a simple representation 
bearing no content and solely referring to something in general: “its properties [of 
subject] are entirely abstracted from if it is designated merely through the expression “I”, 
wholly empty of content (which I can apply to every thinking subject)” (A 355). An 
empty or bare form (A443/B471), I designates, but does not represent: “For in that which 
we call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding, except 
perhaps (if one insists) the I, which is simple only because this representation has no 
content, and hence no manifold, on account of which it seems to represent a simple 
object, or better put, it seems to designate one” (A 381).  
The difference is important: the I appended to thoughts designates the “subject of 
inherence” (A 355); the subject of inherence is not the real thinking subject but a mere 
logical role. The I – as a “simple” or “empty” representation – is a representational 
unicum that only signifies something in general, i.e., a transcendental subject (A 355); it 
represents no thinking subject, as it uses neither content mediation nor prior instances of 
identification. The I is neither conceptual, i.e., articulable in conceptual marks, nor 
intuitional representation, since this presupposes a relation to the sensible spatio-temporal 
forms:  
 
But it is obvious that the subject of inherence is designated only transcendentally through the I 
that is appended to thoughts, without noting the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing 
anything at all about it. It signifies only a Something in general (a transcendental subject), the 
representation of which must of course be simple, just because one determines nothing at all 
about it; for certainly nothing can be represented as more simple than that which is represented 
through the concept of a mere Something. (A 355) 
 
Kant restates this point in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science: 
 
The I, the general correlate of apperception, and itself merely a thought, designates, as a mere 
prefix, a thing of undetermined meaning – namely, the subject of all predicates – without any 
condition at all that would distinguish this representation of the subject from that of a 
something in general: a substance, therefore, of which, by this term, one has no concept of 
what it may be47. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Passage B429 can be employed to sum up the topics developed in this paper; these 
might be grouped into five steps, two metaphysical (the first and the fourth) and three 
epistemic (the others):  
 
(1) [Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the logical function and hence the sheer spontaneity of 
combining the manifold of a merely possible intuition]; (2) [and in no way does it present the 
subject of consciousness as appearance, merely because it takes no account at all of the kind of 
intuition, whether it is sensible or intellectual. In this way I represent myself to myself neither 
as I am nor as I appear to myself], (5) [but rather I think myself only as I do every object in 
general from whose kind of intuition I abstract]. (3) [If here I represent myself as subject of a 
thought or even as ground of thinking, then these ways of representing do not signify the 
categories of substance or cause, for these categories are those functions of thinking (of 
judging) applied to our sensible intuition, which would obviously be demanded if I wanted to 
cognize myself]. (5) [But now I want to become conscious of myself only as thinking]; (2) [I 
put to one side how my proper self is given in intuition, and then it could be a mere 
appearance that I think, but not insofar as I think]; (4) [in the consciousness of myself in mere 
thinking I am the being itself, about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me for 
thinking.] 
 
1. I think (qua Thinking) is spontaneity: “Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the 
logical function and hence the sheer spontaneity of combining the manifold of a merely 
possible intuition”. Understanding is spontaneous (A51/B75) and “can best be understood 
in terms of his identification of its fundamental activity with judgement (A73/B94)”, 
hence the work of judgement can be considered as the sheer spontaneity of understanding 
in action48. If to think is to unify the manifold conceptually, every thought expressed by a 
judgment is necessarily based on the principle of transcendental apperception; it follows 
that apperception is the consciousness of the act of thinking or the consciousness of 
spontaneity. For this reason, Kant identifies the “I think” with apperception taken in itself 
as an act of spontaneity (B132). “I think” (qua Thinking) is then regarded as an act of 
connection of the representations, the supreme principle of all cognition: it is the bearer 
or producer of all judgments, the ground of all mental self-ascriptions, the act of judging 
one’s given representations. This entails that 
2. I think (qua Thinking) is not determined representationally. As spontaneity, I think 
(qua Thinking) represents no thinking subject: “in no way does it present the subject of 
consciousness as appearance, merely because it takes no account at all of the kind of 
intuition, whether it is sensible or intellectual. In this way I represent myself to myself 
neither as I am nor as I appear to myself”. “I put to one side how my proper self is given 
in intuition, and then it could be a mere appearance that I think, but not insofar as I 
think”. A fortiori, this entails that 
3. I think (qua Thinking) is no object of knowledge. “If here I represent myself as 
subject of a thought or even as ground of thinking, then these ways of representing do not 
signify the categories of substance or cause, for these categories are those functions of 
thinking (of judging) applied to our sensible intuition, which would obviously be 
demanded if I wanted to cognize myself”. 
4. I think (qua Thinking) is the being itself. “In the consciousness of myself in mere 
thinking I am the being itself, about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me 
for thinking”. This entails that 
5. I think (qua representation) is the way the subject represents or thinks itself to itself. 
If the “I think” (qua Thinking) is the being itself, and nothing is thereby given to the 
subject for thinking, the subject can think itself only as an object in general: “I think 
myself only as I do every object in general from whose kind of intuition I abstract”. This 
entails that “to become conscious of oneself only as thinking” or to think oneself as 
subject of a thought, or even as the ground of thinking, the subject uses the concept of 
transcendental subject, i.e., the indeterminate thought of a thinking being having an 
existence in itself. Yet, apart from this indeterminate thought, which has its 
representational vehicle in the simple or empty representation I, the subject has no 
acquaintance with itself which grounds this I as a substratum just as it grounds all 
thoughts. For this reason, the consciousness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by 
the I, i.e., by the intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject 
(B278).  
In a nutshell, if the I is the representational correlate of the apperception or the 
representation of a logical subject, it must be understood as the representation of 
something in general as the self-consciousness is an intellectual awareness of self-
existence, unidentifiable from an epistemic angle. What is represented is a transcendental 
subject of thoughts = x, recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates. The 
fact that the transcendental subject of thoughts = x is recognized only through the 
thoughts being its predicates is tantamount to saying that the representation I is contained 
analytically in every thought (A350); or also that the analytical unity of apperception is 
only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic unity (B133-134).  
To think is to unify the manifold conceptually; every thought expressed by a judgment 
must be based on the principle of transcendental apperception. For this reason, Kant 
holds that the I is inherent in the very concept of thought (B132), determining the form of 
every judgment in general terms (B 406). In the A-edition Paralogism, Kant tackles the 
relation between all thoughts and the I taken as the common subject to which they inhere 
to affirm that the representation I features in all thoughts (A 350). The I of apperception – 
seen as a “logically simple subject” – is analytically contained in the concepts of 
“thinking” or “thoughts” (des Denkens) (B 407-8). If the I is the subject of thinking49, and 
if it is not represented except in the form of the judgment established by the synthetic unit 
of apperception, the I expresses the analytical unity of apperception which is only 
possible under the presupposition of some synthetic unity.  
In conclusion, the “I think” (qua Thinking) is the synthetic unit of apperception 
determining the I think (qua representation) as an analytical unity of apperception, i.e., 
the I think (qua representation) is the representation through which the spontaneity of “I 
think” (qua Thinking) is given to one’s own self. In the absence of epistemic mediations 
of identification, considered as simple representations, the I think (qua representation) 
merely designates the activity of thinking transcendentally, namely as the nexus 
established in the judgment by the copula linking the representational synthesis with the 
synthetic unity of apperception on a conceptual basis. The possibility of thinking oneself 
as subject is properly and solely given by the simple and empty representation I. 
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